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COMMENT
Concealing Justices or Concealing
Injustice?: Colombia's Secret Courts
MICHAEL R. PAHL*
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent escape of Pablo Escobar, head of the Medellin drug car-
tel, from his luxury "maximum security" jail represents another sad chap-
ter in the long history of a criminal justice system in crisis. For decades,
judges have been threatened or bribed into compliance with the demands
of criminals from both left and right. Further, Columbia's antiquated
criminal justice system, with little emphasis placed on criminal investiga-
tion, has produced one of the highest impunity rates in the world.'
Colombia desperately needs to reform its criminal justice system.
The existing judicial crisis is an abdication of the state's fundamental and
primordial function-to protect its citizens from a Hobbesian state of
war.' Without an adequate criminal justice system, Colombia will remain
one of the world's most violent democracies, unable to achieve what
Alexis de Toqueville called in Democracy in America the "great aim of
justice . . . to substitute laws for the idea of violence."
Fortunately, Colombia is a country ripe for reform. In 1991, Colom-
bia ratified a new constitution, affecting numerous areas of Colombian
political life. The rights of indigenous peoples have been recognized, and
important human rights reforms have been adopted.' Equally important,
the new constitution promotes pluralistic participation in political life by
eliminating the power-sharing agreement between the two main political
parties. This agreement was adopted in the mid-1950s in order to end the
decade-long civil war known as "la violencia" in which an estimated
* B.A., Creighton University, 1988; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1992.
1. See Gabriel Gutierrez Tovar, Reflexiones sobre la Impunidad, in JUSTICIA, DERECHOS
HUMANOS E IMPUNIDAD 225 (Hector Pefia Diaz, ed.,1991).
2. See Armando Borrero, Constitucion y Orden Publico, 13 REViSTA FoRo 34 (1990).
3. See generally CONST. COLOM. arts. 11-94.
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200,000 Colombians were killed.4 As a result, former leftist guerrillas and
other traditionally marginalized and powerless groups'-workers, peas-
ants, and indigenous peoples-have played an active role in the new gov-
ernment. The 1991 Constitution is thus seen by many as a political and
social revolution, a commendable exercise in the re-creation of constitu-
tional democracy in a country long bled and drained by civil strife.'
In 1991, Colombia enacted important changes in its criminal justice
system. One of the most interesting changes was the creation of a secret
court system for drug and terrorism cases. The hope is that judges who
are granted anonymity by having their identities concealed will be pro-
tected from threats or assassination, enabling the judges to bring
criminals to justice. The crucial question, however, is whether these secret
courts can achieve the twin goals of protecting the judiciary and increas-
ing the conviction rate, without sacrificing the rights of criminal defend-
ants which are guaranteed in the new constitution.
The short answer is that these rights are sacrificed. Although the se-
cret court system has increased the conviction rate and provided some
protection to the judiciary, it has done so at the cost of basic rights of the
criminal defendant. Moreover, the secret court system has been used for
political ends, punishing legitimate political protesters as "terrorists." As
such, the secret court system should be abandoned, as the pursuit of jus-
tice is too precious a jewel to be bought with authoritarian coin.
II. BLOOD ON THE ROBE: COLOMBIA's EMBATTLED JUDICIARY
Violence against the Colombian judiciary has been pervasive, persis-
tent, and deadly. According to a recent study' by the Andean Commission
of Jurists, a human rights group in Bogota, an average of twenty-five
judges and lawyers have been assassinated or have been attacked each
year since 1979. In all, 515 cases of violence against judges and lawyers
have been reported between 1979 and 1991, 329 of which have been
murders or attempts to murder.' And, of the approximately 4,500 Colom-
4. In Colombia, Killings Just Go On and On, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1987, at 10.
5. See HERNANDO VALENCIA VILLA, THE GRAMMAR OF WAR 1-2 (1986).
6. For a less sanguine view, see William C. Banks & Edgar Alvarez, The New Colom-
bian Constitution: Democratic Victory or Popular Surrender?, 23 U. OF MIAMI INTER-AM L.
REV. 39, 85-86 (Fall 1991) ("It is unclear whether the invocation of popular sovereignty to
legitimate the reform process in BogotA reflects a genuine public demand for a new set of
societal rules and institutions. Instead, it could simply be another episode of constitutional
reform serving as a shield to protect the less populist and shorter term political goals of
those in power. Legally, it makes no difference. The Colombian electorate indicated by pleb-
iscite that they wanted a chance to vote for a constitutional assembly, and did just that by
conferring their primary sovereignty upon a popularly elected body").
7. For a thorough description and in-depth analysis of the violence facing Colombia's
judiciary, see Guido Bonilla & Alejandro Valencia Villa, Justice for Justice: Violence
Against Judges and Lawyers in Colombia: 1979-1991 (1992) (on file at the Andean Commis-
sion of Jurists: Colombian Section, BogotA, Colombia).
8. COLOMBIAN SECTION, ANDEAN COMMISSION OF JURISTS, JUSTICIA PARA LA JUSTICIA: VI-
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bian judges, roughly 1,600 have received threats to themselves or their
families. 9
Although Colombia is popularly perceived as a country besieged by
drug-related violence (narcoterrorism), it is important to note that judi-
cial intimidation has been neither exclusively nor primarily linked to
drugtrafflcking.10 According to the Andean Commission study, of the 240
cases of violence against the judiciary with a known author or cause,
eighty have been linked to paramilitary groups, fifty-eight to drugtraffick-
ers, forty-eight to state agents (including the military and the police),
thirty-two to guerrillas, and twenty-two to other factors.11 Corruption and
violence, like blood, runs thick in Colombia, and few have kept their
hands clean.
Violence to the judiciary is as widespread as it is deadly. No sector of
the judicial hierarchy has been untouched. While criminal trial court
judges are the most effected, Justice Ministers and Supreme Court jus-
tices have been threatened or killed as well. Perhaps the most graphic
and poignant illustration of Colombia's embattled judiciary occurred in
November of 1985, when M-19, a leftist group, stormed the Palace of Jus-
tice, taking twenty-four Supreme Court justices hostage. The government
refused to negotiate, choosing a military option instead. In the ensuing
raid, involving over twenty-eight hours of intense fighting and the bomb-
ing of the Palace of Justice by the government, thirty-five members of M-
19, several dozen hostages, a dozen soldiers, and eleven Supreme Court
justices were killed."
What has happened to those who kill members of the judiciary? Vir-
tually nothing. According to the Andean Commission study, in over
eighty percent of the cases reported, there is no evidence of criminal ac-
tion being carried out.'3 As a result, criminal sentences have been im-
posed in only 2.1 percent of cases." The inability of the justice system to
investigate and prosecute the crimes committed against it reflects the dire
situation of Colombia's judiciary: how can the judiciary protect others if
it cannot protect itself?
III. JUECES SIN ROSTRO: FACELESS JUDGES
In response to this drastic situation, Colombia has created a special
jurisdiction of secret courts with jueces sin rostro, or faceless judges, to
protect the judiciary. These courts are known as Courts of Public Order,
dealing with crimes disproportionately affecting the public order, such as
OLENCIA CONTRA JUECES Y ABOGADOS EN COLOMBIA: 1979-1991, 1992 [hereinafter JUSTICIA].
9. Colombia Struggles to Seal Its Judges' Armor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1991, at 10.
10. ,JUSTICIA, supra note 8.
11. Id.
12. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COLOMBIA: A COUNTRY STUDY
298 (Dennis M. Hanratty & Sandra W. Meditz eds., 1990).
13. JUSTICIA, supra note 8.
14. Id.
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drug trafficking, terrorism, kidnapping, and the illegal transportation of
arms.
These special courts were established in 1984 for drug cases and were
expanded in 1987 to include "political crimes" - rebellion, sedition, and
other acts of violence committed with criminal intent.15 In November of
1991, the current President Cesar Gaviria unified both systems under the
Statute for the Defense of Justice. These courts were originally imple-
mented under state of siege legislation and considered "exceptional", as a
scaffolding to be used only until a solid structure of criminal justice could
be constructed. However, with the passage of the New Code of Criminal
Procedure on November 30, 1991, they became a permanent fixture in
Columbia's criminal justice infrastructure16
Eighty-two judges (of which forty-nine are trial judges and thirty-
three are investigative judges) currently sit in these secret courts. All
communication is done either through two-way mirrors using Darth
Vadaresque voice distorters, or in writing. Witness statements are au-
thenticated by a complex system of fingerprints in lieu of signatures.
Opinions are unsigned, with only a judicial number affixed to the deci-
sion. The identity of police agents and informants may be kept secret as
well.' 7 As a final protection, a chief of security is assigned to each court to
coordinate threat assessments, and the judges are provided with armed
escorts to and from work.
The Colombian secret court system, with no known analogue in the
world, has received accolades from the international law enforcement
community, who finally see Colombia cracking down on drugs. 8 Indeed,
in terms of effective law enforcement, the secret court system is to be
commended. After all, the conviction rate is estimated to have jumped
from approximately 10% in ordinary courts to 70% in the secret courts.1 9
And, according to the Andean Commission study, threats against judges
have dropped dramatically, by eighty percent. But at what cost?
IV. PROCEDURAL NIGHTMARES IN COLOMBIA'S SECRET COURTS
The high conviction rate in these special courts should come as no
surprise, given the absence of basic constitutionally-protected procedural
rights that criminal defendants in the United States take for granted. If
one were to red-line the U.S. Bill of Rights and drastically reduce or elim-
inate many protections for criminal defendants, the result would be simi-
lar to the situation facing the accused in Colombia's secret courts.
15. AMERICAS WATCH, POLITICAL MURDER & REFORM IN COLOMBIA: THE VIOLENCE CON-
TINUES 98 (1992).
16. Id.
17. COLOMBIAN SECTION, ANDEAN COMMISSION OF JURISTS, UNA JUSTICIA AMENZADA:
COMMENTARIOS AL ESTATUTO PARA LA DEFENSA DE LA JUSTICIA 2 (1991).
18. See Steven Flanders & Ana Maria Salazar, Colombia's Purgatory, N.Y.L.J. 2 (Jan.
21, 1992).
19. Colombia Struggles to Seal Its Judges' Armor, supra note 9.
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For example, the criminal defendant in the Colombian secret court
system has no 8th Amendment right to a bail hearing. 20 Under U.S. law,
by contrast, pre-trial detention through the denial of bail is considered
the exception rather than the rule. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution
prohibited the imposition of excessive bail in the Bill of Rights to prevent
the recurrence of the harsh treatment suffered by colonists in British jails
during the Colonial Period.2 ' From this constitutional basis, U.S. law has
developed to the point that in the federal system, pre-trial detention is
only available if the government can demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant is likely to flee the jurisdiction, or that no
release conditions "will reasonably assure. . .the safety of any other per-
son and the community.'
2
In Colombia's secret courts, by contrast, the accused must suffer the
indignity of incarceration, separated from family and friends, with abso-
lutely no burden on the government to justify this deprivation of liberty.
More importantly, the absence of 8th Amendment protection may seri-
ously prejudice the criminal defendant in the preparation of his defense.
Stuck in jail with no hope of release, the criminal defendant may find it
difficult to contact and prepare witnesses for his defense, or confer with
his lawyer at his leisure.
At the trial stage the treatment of the accused turns from bad to
worse. Secret proceedings eliminate the 6th Amendment right to a public
trial,"2 ensuring that violations of constitutional rights are concealed from
20. See COLUMBIA SECTION, ANDEAN COMMISSON OF JURISTS, SISTEMA JUDICIAL Y DEE-
ECHOS HUMANOS EN COLOMBIA 43 (1990).
21. Ironically, the "bail clause [adopted by the Framers] was lifted with slight changes
from the English Bill of Rights Act." See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952), reh.
den., 343 U.S. 988. The right to a bail hearing, however, has not been extended to state
prosecutions. See Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502, 59 L.Ed. 1071, 35 S.Ct. 649 (1915).
22. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 95 L.Ed.2d 697, 107 S.Ct. 2095 (1987)
("In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the care-
fully limited exception."). Expressed in a different vein, the Federal Bail Reform Act, codi-
fied in 18 U.S.C.S § 3142(f), requires that a judge inclined in the first instance towards the
release of an accused on his own recognizance or upon unsecured bond.
23. The Sixth Amendment right to a public trial has been made applicable to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92
L.Ed. 682 (1948). Exceptions to a right to the public trial have been held permissible in
certain exceptional circumstances. As stated by the Supreme Court, "the party seeking to
close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the
closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must
consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings ade-
quate to support the closure." Wailer v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31
(1984). As an illustration, see United States v. Hernadez, 608 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1979) (ex-
clusion of spectators allowed when witness had been subjected to pretrial threats); United
States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1969) (exclusion of spectators who
threatened witness at trial); United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937, 96 S.Ct. 296, 46 L.Ed.2d 269 (exclusion of spectators dur-
ing the testimony of an undercover agent engaged in ongoing investigations proper); United
States ex rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1965) (exclusion of spectators permissi-
ble when necessary to preserve order in the courtroom).
1993
DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
public scrutiny.2 4 On the political level, secret courts also militate against
the openness in government reflected in the new Columbian Constitution.
Through public trials, citizens may learn about the machinery of their
government, acquiring confidence that the judicial process is not being
used for abusive ends. 5 Further, as a practical matter, public trials make
the proceedings known to possible witnesses who otherwise might be un-
known to the parties.26
The system of secret witnesses, violates the 6th Amendment right to
confront witnesses, one of the most valuable defense tools. In these
courts, defense lawyers may neither question witnesses before trial nor
cross-examine them at trial. This prevents the defense from calling a wit-
ness' demeanor, credibility, or bias into question (although a conviction
cannot be based on a single secret testimony). As a result, a central prin-
ciple of the U.S. trial system-that truth is best revealed through an ad-
versarial process in which both parties present their case, with witnesses
subject to cross-examination and evidence subject to contradiction-is se-
verely curtailed.
Colombians may be familiar with the adversary system in action
through the popular television show "Las Leyes de Los Angeles," or
"L.A. Law." But the adversary system's utility extends far beyond mak-
ing exciting television episodes. Rather, on the philosophical level, the ad-
versary system attempts to check what Weber called the modern state's
monopoly on force 2 -its power to investigate, prosecute, and pun-
ish-through giving the defense the opportunity to put into question the
government's evidence and witnesses. Regrettably, in Colombia's secret
courts, there is little to control the Leviathan. The danger is that the
judge will consider only the evidence and uncontroverted testimony
proferred by the government; tipping the scales of justice in their favor.
The criminal defendant is further prejudiced by the massive system
of protection provided for government informants. The cornucopia of
benefits provided those who collaborate with the authorities by testifying
against the accused include pecuniary compensation, a new identity, exit
from the country, immediate conditional release, and exemption from
punishment.2" While the Federal Witness Protection Program" in the
24. See In re Oliver, supra note 23 ("The traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret
trials has been variously ascribed to the notorious use of this practice by the Spanish Inqui-
sition, to the excesses of the English Court of Star Chamber, and to the French Monarcy's
abuse of the lettre de cachet. . .[Wlhatever other benefits the guarantee to the accused that
his trial be conducted in public may confer upon our society, the guarantee has always been
recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of
persecution").
25. See Ravinsky v. McKaskle, 772 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1984).
26. See 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834 (Chadbourn rev. 1976).
27. For a discussion of the moral justification of the modern state's monopoly on force,
see ROBERT NoziCK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 89-119 (1974).
28. Id.
29. The Federal Witness Protection Program, established by Congress in 1984, autho-
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U.S. provides similar benefits and protections, 0 there is a crucial
difference.
In the U.S. system, the witness must still be present at trial. This
subjects the witness to the moral constraint of lying in front of the ac-
cused, and, more importantly, to the cross-examination of an aggressive
defense attorney.3 ' Further, having the witness present at trial tends to
assure testimonial trustworthiness by inducing fear that any false testi-
mony will be detected. 2 The danger in Colombia is that the government,
in its zealous pursuit of convictions, may play the role of the serpent in
the Garden of Eden-tempting witnesses and informants to lie with the
fruit of governmental goodies-unchecked by the power of a probing and
thorough cross-examination.
In short, the Colombian secret court system amounts to a criminal
defendant's nightmare. Colombia has its Gabriel Garcia Marquez to de-
scribe the realismo fantastico of Colombian life; what it lacks is a Franz
Kafka to describe the judicial absurdity its many Joseph K's face in the
secret court system. Criminal defendants are being convicted by unknown
witnesses paid by the state, absent from the trial, and immune from
cross-examination. Further, if the judge decides the evidence must be
kept secret, the "judicial decision" may be a mere piece of paper, contain-
ing only the judge's number. The concept of feeling guilty without know-
ing why may make for interesting existential novels, but it has no place in
criminal law-especially when one is being punished for crimes that carry
penalties of up to thirty years in jail. A system that cripples a solid crimi-
nal defense, and leaves judicial decisions unexplained, reflects a process
of judgment more reminiscent of the Medieval Inquisition than of mod-
ern 'standards of criminal justice.3 3 The "miracle" of the Colombian secret
court system is not that seventy percent of those accused are convicted,
but that thirty percent go free.
rizes the Attorney General to take such action as he deems "necessary to protect the person
involved from bodily injury and otherwise to assure the health, safety, and welfare of that
person [or an immediate family member or close associate], including the psychological well-
being and social adjustment of that person, for as long as, in the judgment of the Attorney
General, the danger to that person exists." 18 U.S.C. § 3521(b)(1).
30. Among these include new identification documents, housing, moving expenses, em-
ployment assistance, and "a payment to meet basic living expenses." 18 U.S.C. §
3521(b)(1)(A)-(H).
31. For a sample of an effective cross-examination, see Frank Rubino's cross-examina-
tion of Federal Witness Protection Program participant Danny Martinez in Dealing with
the Devil (and Lesser Imps), 20 Crim. Prac. Man. (BNA) 464 (Sept. 30, 1992); see also
Expert can show how Sweet Cooperating Witness's Deal Is, 5 Crim. Prac. Man. (BNA) 465
(Oct. 2, 1991).
32. See WIGMORE, supra note 26.
33. See Alejandro David Aponte, Como matar a la justicia en la tarea de defenderla:
"Estatuto para la defensa de la justicia," 11 ANALISIS POLITICO 77 (1990).
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V. CASTING THE CRIMINAL NET: POLITICAL ABUSE OF COLOMBIA'S SECRET
COURTS
The lack of procedural rights in the secret court system are problem-
atic; however, its potential for political abuse is even more concerning.
Latin America is notorious for its caudillos or dictators of both left and
right, from Castro to Pinochet, who have abused power to strengthen
their regimes while violating basic human rights. Accordingly, any in-
crease in the state's power, particularly the removal from the public eye
of the state's power to discipline and punish, must be subject to the
strictest scrutiny.
The Colombian government has claimed that the purpose of the se-
cret court system is two-fold and inter-related: to protect judges and to
combat terrorism. While fighting terrorism is a valid and essential goal, a
wide criminal net can be cast over that rubric. The danger is that the
Colombian government, seeking a surcease of the violence that has made
Colombia one of the world's most violent democracies, will use an over-
expansive definition of "terrorist" to mask prosecutions against political
dissidents or to cover daily arbitrary violations of human rights."'
The problem of interpretation is essentially one of language. As An-
glo-American legal theorists from H.L.A. Hart to Albert Saks have noted,
restricting legal terms to one fixed literal meaning is difficult, for words
are inherently ambiguous. Continental deconstructionists such as Michel
Foucault or Jacques Derrida would go even further, claiming that the
meaning of the written word eludes even the author herself, and must be
interpreted in a sociological and contextual framework.
While this presents problems for a judge seeking the "literal" mean-
ing of a statute, it can have grave consequences when applied to a slip-
pery term such as "terrorist" or as manipulable a phrase as "acts of rebel-
lion or sedition." For, as Montesquieu sagely noted, ". .. not defining
what is meant by treason is enough for the government to become
despotic."
Who has been caught in Colombia's terrorist net? Human rights ad-
vocates report that student protestors, peasants, and others critical of the
present regime have been convicted in these secret courts for legitimate
acts of social protest.35 Indeed, the irony is that a liberal interpretation of
the phrase "acts of rebellion or sedition" could be applied to the very
grass-roots student movement which led to the important constitutional
reforms of 1991. An over-broad net has been cast in the fight against
narcoterrorism as well, dragging in both major drugtraffickers such as
Pablo Escobar, with millions to spend in his defense, and mere consumers
34. See Fernando Velasquez V., EL ESTATUTO PARA LA DEFENSA DE LA JUSTICIA: UN
RETORNO A LA INQUISITION!, 51 NuEvo FORO PENAL 4 (1991).
35. Interview with Alejandro David Aponte, Professor of Law, Universidad de Los An-
des, at the Andean Commission of Jurists, BogotA, Colombia, Aug. 18, 1992.
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too poor to afford their own lawyer."
By punishing acts of political protest, the Colombian government is
frustrating the purpose of the new constitution, which seeks dialogue for
the resolution of social conflict. Voices muted in the past by a de jure
power-sharing arrangement between the two main political parties and de
facto class stratification, will remain silent if the government continues to
abuse the secret courts for political ends. Further, expanding the criminal
net in this manner violates a time-honored and internationally-respected
principle of criminal law,. nulla poena sin lege ("no punishment without a
crime"). According to this doctrine, criminal statutes are to be narrowly
construed as a check on the government's power, to protect citizens from
arbitrary and unanticipated incarceration. No one should be judged and
punished without conforming to the preexisting law for which he is pun-
ished.3 7 Regrettably, such is the situation facing these erstwhile pplitical
protestors turned "terrorists" by the secret court system.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Colombian secret court system has been a moderate success.
Supporters of the system point to the degree of security it provides to a
beleaguered judiciary, helping to remove the death sentence under which
many judicial officials worked in the past. They note as well that criminal
convictions have risen dramatically, helping to lower the high impunity
rate plaguing the country.
Supporters of the system fail to recognize two critical points, how-
ever. The first is the limited efficacy of the protection the system pro-
vides. The second is the tremendous cost to personal liberty and political
participation of the secret court system.
The argument that the secret court system provides greater protec-
tion for judges is specious in several aspects. First of all, security is lim-
ited to a minority of judges-jueces sin rostro and Supreme Court jus-
tices-while the great majority of judicial functionaries go unprotected.
Even the protected judicial elite is only safe from 9 to 5. Further, it ap-
pears that the efficacy of the secret court system will be of limited dura-
tion. As recently as September 19, 1992, a jueza sin rostro and her three
bodyguards were assassinated in front of her home by sicarios in Medel-
lin.ss As critics had predicted, the veil of secrecy has been irreparably
torn. Finally, the decrease in violence to the judiciary should not be too
quickly accredited to the secret court system. The ban on extradition of
Colombian nationals and the inclusion of leftist groups in the new consti-
36. Id.; see also Aponte, supra note 33, at 79.
37. In the United States, constitutional due process requires that the statute which
defines a substantive crime must "give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden." Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162,
92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972).
38. Asesinada una jueza sin rostro, EL TIEMPO, Sept. 19, 1992, at IA; see also Narcos
amenazan a jueces sin rostro, EL TEMPO, June 6, 1992, at 1A.
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tution have played an equally important role in the recent cessation of
attacks on the judiciary.
The second argument in favor of the secret court system, that it has
increased the conviction rate, is equally troubling. High conviction rates
can always be achieved by clipping the rights of criminal defendants. Fur-
thermore, troublesome political "enemies" can always be more easily
dealt with through the long arm of the law rather than through thie long
and arduous process of negotiation and dialogue which, democracy de-
mands. Colombia is a country seeking to create itself anew, to secure a
respite from the violence which has plagued the country for years on end.
The 1991 Constitution, promoting pluralistic participation in political life
and the laying down of arms, is a step in the right direction. The secret
court system, with its clipping of procedural rights and criminalization of
dissent-is not. Justice, like the beautiful emeralds for which Colombia is
renowned, is too precious a jewel to be bought with authoritarian coin.
